Japan consists of many small inhabited islands in addition to four main islands. We examine the impact of fiscal expenditure and the number of tourists on per capita taxable income in remote islands using panel data analysis. The results show that both fiscal expenditure and population size have significant positive impacts on per capita taxable income, whereas the number of tourists does not have statistically significant impact. They indicate that tourism development would not work as a substitute for financial support from the government. In other words, continuous financial support may be needed to maintain the islands' economies.
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
There is a large body of empirical analyses of the impact of international economic support or tourism on internal economic growth in some island states; for example, GANI, 1998, examined the macroeconomic determinants of economic growth in the South Pacific island states using cross-country data and GOUNDER, 2001, demonstrated the relationship between foreign aid and economic growth in the Fiji islands using time series data. We propose several reasons why the economies of most island states seem unable to grow very rapidly. First, the economies of most island states depend largely on agriculture, fisheries, and forestry. Second, due to the constraints of small populations, it is hard to foster the manufacturing industry, which has economies of scale and agglomeration externalities. Some developed countries, however, also face these issues and try to deal with them to develop the local economy.
Japan is an island state. It consists of about 6,800 small inhabited islands in addition to the four main islands (Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku, and Kyushu) and Okinawa Main Island located in the southwest of the Japanese Archipelago 1 . As many of these islands are located far from the main islands or lack affordable transportation, their economies are isolated from the mainland;
that is, there is a difference in affluence between the people living in small islands and those living on the mainland.
The Japanese government has been implementing a wide variety of measures at the national level to promote the development of remote islands. The Improvement of Sea Routes to Remote Islands Act enacted on July 4, 1952 (hereafter referred to as the "Remote Islands Act"), was the first measure toward assisting the remote islands. It laid down some guidelines for economic development in remote islands: under this Act, the central government would provide public funds to maintain and improve access from remote islands to the mainland. The Law for Development of Remote Islands was enacted on July 22, 1953, as temporary legislation with a limit of 10 years following the Remote Islands Act; it has been amended four times and extended five times during the past 50 years. The Law for Development of Remote Islands aims to improve fundamental conditions in remote islands, focusing on improving and upgrading social as well as industrial infrastructure. The role of remote islands in protecting an exclusive economic zone was also On the other hand, the Japanese government has kicked off a nationwide tourism campaign named "YOKOSO! JAPAN (Welcome to Japan!)" to attract millions of inbound tourists.
According to the Japan National Tourist Organization, there is a large gap between the number of outbound and inbound tourists: in 2005, there were about 17.4 million outbound tourists, whereas the number of inbound tourists was estimated at approximately 6.7 million. The Japanese government has pushed forward with policies to attract foreign tourists in order to revitalize the local and national economies. This indicates that tourism development is expected to be an important and effective economic measure for local regions including remote islands. However, there has been no empirical analysis of whether tourism development in remote islands can be a substitute for financial assistance from the central government.
In this paper, we investigate the effectiveness of tourism development in remote islands as an economic measure. In particular, we examine the impact of fiscal expenditure of municipalities that supervise remote islands 5 and the number of tourists on per capita taxable income in remote islands using a panel data analysis.
The results show that the number of tourists has no significant and positive impact on per capita taxable income in remote islands. In other words, continuous financial support may be needed to maintain islands' economies. Furthermore, shrinking populations also have a large negative impact on the islands' economies. This indicates that the islands' economies would worsen if the residents were forced to relocate to the mainland as a result of a further decrease in financial aid to remote islands.
The paper consists of three sections. In the next section, we explain the panel data used in this study and conduct an empirical analysis to estimate the impact of fiscal expenditure on municipalities and the number of tourists on per capita taxable income in remote islands. The final section presents conclusions based on demographic, social, and economic trends, and discusses implications for further research.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
We conducted an empirical analysis of the islands under the Remote Islands Development There is a need for a careful examination of the data before an empirical analysis. We had to analyze two kinds of data: municipality-based data (population size, fiscal expenditure, and taxable income) and island-based data (the number of tourists). We show further details of each type of data in Table 1 . To analyze these more easily and clearly, we defined the "island regions"
as outlined below to make the island authorities correspond to the municipal authorities, and use the data recalculated by each island region.
To assist understanding, we provide an illustration of two islands (Islands 1 and 2) that are divided into three parts (A, B, and C) and two parts of the mainland (D and E) in Fig. 1 . We also assume that both Islands 1 and 2 are under the Remote Islands Development Laws.
First, we consider the case in which one or more municipalities take charge only of islands. If one municipality supervises Island 1 (A), we define the island region as Island 1 (A) itself. If two municipalities share parts of two islands (A + B and C), the island region is defined as both Islands 1 and 2 (A + B + C).
If a municipality supervises Island 1 as well as a part of the mainland (D), we denote the island region as Region (A + D). We also note that there are some cases in which two municipalities share parts of two islands and each of them supervises a part of the mainland (A +
B + D and E + C). Then the island region is defined as Region (A + B + C + D + E).
We obtain 165 island regions using all of the available data, 124 after excluding missing values. We show the list of islands in 
If we introduce a parameter that represents the difference between a variable at time t and that at time t-1, that is, 
Thus, the fiscal and tourism multipliers and the effect of population size in the long run are denoted by β , γ , and δ , respectively 9 . Using this formula, (1) is then modified as:
Applying this model to panel data allows us to relax the constancy of the intercept α . In particular, the variable α can be divided into three separate components as follows: We set the maximum lag length to five, and chose one model from both linear and log-linear models where the SBIC was minimized. Next, we conducted nonnested tests (P E tests), as proposed by MACKINNON et al., 1983 , between these two models, and examined which model the data better supported 10 . We have annual data for 26 years from 124 regions. As data from the first five years was used only as explanatory variables to estimate lag length, 2,604 observations were available for this survey (2,604=124*(26-5)).
In the first procedure, we chose the model that had only a time dummy and 0 lag in each case of linear and log-linear models as "the selected model" (see Table 2 ). We also show the results of nonnested tests between these selected models in Table 3 . We then finally select the log-linear model that has only a time dummy and 0 lag since the null hypothesis is rejected if we set the null hypothesis that the true model is a linear model and the null hypothesis is not rejected if we set the null hypothesis that the true model is a log-linear model, simultaneously.
The results of the selected log-linear model in Table 4 indicate that the estimated coefficient of the tourism (per capita tourists) is not statistically significant. We then defined "the minimum SBIC model" as the log-linear model that has only a time dummy and 0 lag estimated without a tourism variable. Table 3 shows that we also selected the minimum SBIC model rather than the selected linear model, as the null hypothesis is not rejected if we set the null hypothesis to be that the minimum SBIC model is optimal.
Since we used panel data, we had to examine whether the random effects model could be applied. In Table 5 , we show the estimated results of the random effects model with time-variant error components ( t τ ) 11 . Although the value of SBIC of the random effects model is smaller than that of the fixed effects model (see Tables 4 and 5) , the Hausman specification test statistics are significant, which indicates a correlation between the error term and the explanatory variables.
Then we conclude that the fixed effects model is preferred to the random effects model. We should also note that there is little difference in any of the estimated coefficients, excluding the constant term, between the fixed effects model and the random effects model. In the column "transformed"
in Table 5 , we show the corresponding coefficients calculated from original estimates of the random effects model. Now, we examine the impacts of government expenditure and tourism in accordance with the results of the selected log-linear model in Table 4 . The R-squared value for this model is very high, at almost 0.98, due to dummy variables. There is not much difference between the estimated coefficients of government expenditure and tourism: their elasticity values are estimated to be between 0.23 and 0.24. Tourism, however, has a t-value of 1.14, which is not statistically significant. On the other hand, the t-value for government expenditure is statistically significant.
Taking into account the minimum SBIC model, which is estimated without the tourism variable, the government expenditure in Japanese island regions has a significant positive impact on the per capita taxable income, whereas the number of tourists does not. Table 4 also shows that the population size has a positive and statistically significant coefficient. It indicates that population growth also increases the productivity of the local economy in the island regions. We also note that the adjustment coefficient is estimated to be 0.026, which indicates a relatively slow adjustment of taxable income: it takes 88 years to achieve 90% of the "ideal income", or 27 years to reach 50%.
We conclude by discussing the following implications of these findings for economic development in the remote islands in Japan. First, the government expenditure can be considered an effective method for economic development in remote islands. Second, there is some doubt about whether tourism development may be regarded as an effective method for economic development in remote islands. Last, the expected population decrease in remote islands will have a negative impact on economic development.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we examine the impacts of fiscal expenditure, the number of tourists, and the population size on the per capita taxable income of 124 island regions in Japan by conducting an empirical analysis using panel data. A log-linear partial adjustment model that has only a time dummy and 0 lag is selected as the optimal model by the SBIC and a nonnested test. The estimated results indicate that both fiscal expenditure and population size have a significant positive impact on the per capita taxable income, whereas the number of tourists has no statistically significant impact. We discuss the political implications of these results: (1) the taxable income in the remote islands would decrease if financial support from the central government to local governments decreases; and (2) the tourism development expected to be an effective measure for economic development would not work as a substitute for financial support from the government. There is a possibility that further reduction of taxable income would result if declines in population size and government expenditure are both taken into account, although we have not adequately analyzed this effect in this paper.
There is a possibility that the t-value for tourism may be underestimated if the coefficient for tourism is different in each island region. Taking into account the results for the Amami Oshima
Islands, which were shown by ISHIKAWA and FUKUSHIGE, 2006, we cannot deny the possibility that either a linear or a log-linear model would be appropriate in particular island regions. To resolve this issue, we have to conduct the above model selection procedure in each island region. However, we have to interpret the results of this procedure with caution because of the lack of sufficient annual data.
If the estimated results are different in each island region, then the appropriate measures for each island region should be implemented. In particular, the economic development issues in the remote islands should be addressed according to the islands' individual economic and social conditions rather than the entire island region being administered by the Law for Development of Remote Islands.
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